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COMMENTS: INDIVIDUAL VERSUS
COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY
Thomas Nagel*
Anne Alstott and Robert Cooter both address a question that is at
the center of Rawls's concerns about moral and social theory-a topic
that also arose prominently in the earlier panels on Gender and on
Tort-the division between private and public responsibility in the
design of a just social order. They raise the question in two different
domains-child or dependent care and economic redistribution-and
their responses tend in opposite directions. Alstott favors an increase
in public responsibility for what is nevertheless an aspect of private
life,' while Cooter favors an increase of personal responsibility for
what Rawls thinks of as a demand on the design of economic
institutions. I
Alstott's "Caretaker Resource Accounts" would have some
redistributive effect, both because they would distribute from the
childless to those with children, and because, though not allocated on
basis of need, they would presumably be financed out of progressive
taxes. But the aim of the program would not be distributive justice in
the usual sense. As she says, the aim is to rectify to some extent the
inequalities in autonomy that arise from the special obligations of
caretakers.' While individuals incur these obligations by having
children, they are in a sense also society's obligations, assigned to the
individuals naturally placed to fulfill them.
Every society has an obligation, as well as reasons of collective self-
interest, to provide a decent start in life for those born into it. The
natural placement of the major burden of carrying out this obligation
on private action by particular individuals creates a deep structural
inequality of autonomy and opportunity in the society. From a liberal
egalitarian point of view, such inequality must be ameliorated, but this
cannot be done by turning child-care into a public institution.
Caretaker Resource Accounts would attempt to lessen this inequality,
while leaving the private institution of the family intact.
What is the relation of this proposal to the conception of social
* University Professor, New York University.
1. See Anne L. Alstott, What Does a Fair Society Owe Children-And Their
Parents?, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 1941, 1963-65 (2004).
2. See Robert D. Cooter, The Donation Registry, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 1981, 1984-
85 (2004).
3. Alstott, supra note 1, at 1976.
2015
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
justice found in Rawls's writings? The answer is not straightforward,
because Rawls always emphasizes that the main target of evaluation
for his principles of justice is the basic structure of society, which
determines the ex ante allocation of opportunities and expectations at
birth.4 If the basic structure is fair, then inequalities arising through
the free exercise of their autonomy by individuals living out their lives
inside that structure are not objectionable from the standpoint of
justice.
It is therefore important, in interpreting Rawls's conception, to
decide what is part of the basic structure and what is not. The delicacy
of the distinction is particularly evident in relation to the family and
its effects. Rawls holds that the prevailing structures of family life are
part of the basic structure of society, and that the socio-economic class
stratification that results from the transmission of material and
cultural capital along family lines is one of the most important forms
of inequality that has to be brought into conformity with principles of
justice, through public policies.5  But he does not believe that
individual conduct against the background of those institutions is to
be governed by the same egalitarian principles.6
The deep inequality that concerns Alstott regarding child or
dependent care is not like the inequalities of class, which are present
at birth.7 Nor is it exactly like the inequalities of sex, also present at
birth in every society in which the opportunities and expectations of
women are systematically less than those of men.8 While it is an
inequality whose burden falls disproportionately on women, it
appears, contingently, in the lives of persons of both sexes and in
every class in virtue of their becoming the primary caretaker of a
child.9 In that sense it is part of the possibilities at birth for everyone.
If we nevertheless regard child and dependent care as the kind of
burden that has to be ironed out on grounds of justice, I suggest this is
for one or a combination of the following three reasons:
(a) Child and dependent care falls as a matter of social fact
disproportionately on women, and therefore casts its
shadow back overwhelmingly on the ex ante life prospects
of women from birth.
(b) It is an uncompensated selective assignment to a subset of
the citizenry of a public obligation, and therefore a violation
of the presumption of equal liberty.
4. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 6-7 (rev. ed. 1999).
5. Id. at 62-64.
6. Id. at 277.
7. See Alstott, supra note 1.
8. See id. at 1978.
9. See id. at 1964.
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(c) Some inequalities that result from contingent choices or the
accidents of life are just as much the concern of justice as
inequalities in the basic structure of society.
I would opt for the first two reasons, but it may be that Alstott
would appeal to the third as well. My inclination is to believe that
since many inequalities that result from choice or accident are not
matters of justice, the identification of those which are will end up
taking us back to the first two reasons: Some choices are
predominantly expected of women, and they thereby carry the lion's
share of an autonomy-restricting burden that fulfills an obligation of
the society as a whole.
At any rate, I think Alstott is right to propose the use of monetary
transfers to counter deep inequalities of autonomy and expectations
that are created by the customary patterns of sexual and family
relations, 10 aspects of the basic structure that cannot realistically be
reconstructed by publicly mandated institutional reform.
Robert Cooter's proposal to shift more of the work of redistribution
into private hands through public encouragement and publicity seems
to be intended as a partial alternative to Rawls's conception of
distributive justice.1 In Rawls's view, distributive justice should be
realized as far as possible through the creation of property
entitlements by the economic system, including taxes. Once that goal
is achieved, what people have is theirs to spend as they wish, and they
are not being unjust if they spend it in ways that reflect no distributive
ideal.
Of course if the economic and fiscal system is not just, individuals
who have benefited economically through it are in a different position,
and probably have an obligation deriving from justice to engage in
some compensatory charity. But I believe this is not the only point
Cooter is making. He thinks, I take it, that a system which leaves a
good deal of the redistributive job to free individual choice-with
public encouragement-will be not only more efficient than one that
works by the definition of property rights, but also morally superior.12
I am doubtful. There seems to me a big difference between charity
that combats socio-economic injustice by helping the poor, and charity
that supports special religious, social, cultural, or natural goods that
individuals may care about though it is not required by justice. Of
course in a society in which the state will not or cannot achieve justice,
the first kind of charity is more important. But the second kind is
much more appropriate as a project of private action. Ideally, public
policy would ensure distributive justice and fair equality of
10. See Alstott, supra note 1, at 1964.
11. Cooter, supra note 2.
12. Id. at 1988-89.
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opportunity, and individual charity would be able to concentrate on
special, optional goods, using the resources that individuals
legitimately hold under a fair system of private property acquisition.
Justice should be a matter of entitlement, not charity, and securing
justice through legal shaping of the mechanisms by which private
property is created and transmitted should be our ideal. Cooter may
be saying merely that this is utopian, as things are at present, and he
may be right. But if so, then a second-best arrangement relying on
private charity would probably have to do more to steer contributions
toward the needy instead of toward the cultural and educational
institutions, estimable though they are, that now receive so much
support.
Encouraging contributions with a fixed-percentage tax credit rather
than a tax deduction might lead to a rise in contributions by less
affluent people, against the background of progressive marginal tax
rates-and that might lead to support for more basic benefits. But I
don't know whether there is any empirical reason to think this-
perhaps it would just lead to more support for religion.
The sharp moral distinction between individual and collective
responsibility is a notable and controversial feature of Rawls's liberal
outlook. It is at the heart of his defense of a liberal egalitarian market
system, in which individuals have free disposition over their private
property, but the distribution of private property is strongly shaped
and legally defined by the tax and transfer system. Such a view is
always under pressure from opposite directions. Some critics think
the property regime should be less affected by considerations of
collective responsibility.13 Others think individuals should bear more
responsibility to serve the same ends of justice that are demanded of
collective institutions.14 Many people find the sharp distinction
paradoxical, since it implies a division of public and private attitudes
within each citizen.
The conventionality of property, a fundamental part of Rawls's
outlook, is a premise of The Myth of Ownership.5 Though rights of
private property are a fundamental part of individual liberty, they are
included in, but do not themselves determine, the procedural
definition of property, which in turn determines what it is that each
person has those rights to. That definition is itself based largely on
standards of justice and the general welfare, rather than on pre-
13. See generally Richard Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of
Eminent Domain (1985).
14. See, e.g., G.A. Cohen, If You're an Egalitarian, How Come You're So Rich?
(2000); see also Liam B. Murphy, Institutions and the Demands of Justice, 27 Phil. &
Pub. Aff. 251-91 (1998).
15. Liam Murphy & Thomas Nagel, The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice
(2002).
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institutional rights.
This means, as Linda Sugin observes, that the justice of taxes, which
are part of the definition of property, has to be determined not by
deontological standards applied to the distribution of tax burdens
taken in isolation, but by their contribution to the justice of the socio-
economic system as a whole. 6 The evaluation of tax policy therefore
depends on empirical estimates of its consequences.
We see the role of conflicting empirical predictions in the
arguments over the Bush tax cuts. To argue against them even on
egalitarian grounds it is not enough to point out that they are mostly
going to the rich; one also has to contest the claims made for their
superior indirect effects on prosperity and employment. But we can
also use Rawls's way of thinking about property to attack bad non-
empirical arguments for certain tax policies-for abolition of the
estate tax and the tax on dividends, for example, on the ground that
they constitute double taxation-or the general hostility to taxes on
the ground that it's your money and the government is taking it away
from you.
Sugin brings up one way that taxes might be judged by their
immediate rather than their broader economic effect: the use of taxes
to inhibit the formation of vast inequalities of wealth on the ground
not of distributive justice, but of the destructive effect of economic
power on political equality.17 This is an important issue: Do we want
to use tax policy to put a brake on large accumulations of wealth and
their dynastic transmission-either to preserve political equality or to
moderate the hereditary class structure? It was Rawls's view that
great extremes of wealth as the social norm are essentially
undemocratic. Even though some billionaires have democratic
sympathies, I believe that the clearest case for a tax policy directly
supported by Rawls's conception of justice is that the estate tax should
not be eliminated.
The topic of our conference is Rawls and the Law, but the
discussion we have had in this panel on Property, Taxation, and
Distributive Justice shows how far the reality of law is from Rawls's
ideals. The concern for social justice seems to have almost
disappeared from the nation's political discourse, and instead we are
facing a concerted attempt by the present administration to eliminate
all fiscal barriers to the growth of economic inequality.
Rawls himself did not seek or expect to produce an immediate
political impact through his work; he was content to hope that his
ideas might have an indirect effect over the long term-the usual case
16. See Linda Sugin, Theories of Distributive Justice and Limitations on Taxation:
What Rawls Demands From Tax Systems, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 1991, 1992-93 (2004).
17. Id. at 2009-10.
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with philosophy, if it has any effect at all. Still, when academics talk to
one another about justice as we have on this occasion, it is sobering to
think how utopian these philosophical ideals seem in comparison with
the intellectual disgrace in the world around us.
